Noel Everson

A more fundamental approach to utilitarianism

Written 2025-07-22 · Published · Last edited —

I've been using utilitarianism as the basis of my moral system for the past 3~4 years.
Bentham's thesis was attractive in many ways: the axiomatic foundation of the good and the bad, a clear and concise goal, a systematic yet flexible ethical judgement, etc..

In fact, the axiomatic approach has been my favorite part; finally, an answer to the questions of all questions of why : for what and why? For the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Happiness is good, it's maximisation is therefore also good , hence for the greatest number .

happiness = good is an axiom (I will call it the axiom of good), so one cannot explain it, it is very basis of a conversation. However, I observe a logical imperfection in the continuation from the axiom of good to the theorem of maximization (the conjecture of maximization would be therefore more fitting) .

Happiness is good, but why aim for its greatest potency in the greatest number ? Said principle is about the greatest happiness for the greatest number, a proposition disconnected, unexplained, by the axiom of good . It seems obvious at first, but I've come to realized that the usage of the theorem of maximization breeds ethical ambiguity that seems to be Utilitarianism's Achilles' heel. The vast majority of the counter arguments that were suggested to me against the principle of utility are now clearly debunked by the fact that we were using the theorem of maximization without defining it.

Here is the solution, a tool that allows us to get more fundamental in the principle of morality: Morality is always relative, a clear referential frame is indispensable; in other words, there is no absolute moral truth, there must be always the relative observer of an ethical judgment.

I more fundamental proposition would be therefore :

From this , we can point to utilitarianism : in the referential frame of society, the greatest good IS the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But we still can change the referential frame.

There is no absolute moral truth , only relative proposition, with the good being the presence , potential or immediate, of happiness.

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